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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The primary issue on this appeal pertains to a retrial of 
a defendant on certain counts deadlocked by a prior jury 
without resubmission of those counts to a grand jury. The 
question presented is novel and complex, although 
prosecution of criminal cases by indictment even precedes 
the adoption of the federal constitution. The genesis of the 
appeal is a motion by the prosecution, following a prior jury 
trial, to dismiss several counts of the indictment on which 
the jury had deadlocked and proceed to sentence on the 
counts on which it had convicted. 
 
A grand jury in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania initially indicted the 
defendant, Merritt G. Stansfield, Jr., on eleven counts and 
a separate count of money laundering forfeiture. Thefirst 
four of the eleven counts charged mail fraud. Count V 
charged using fire to commit mail fraud and one count of 
arson. Counts VI through X charged money laundering. 
Count XI charged tampering with a witness. The defendant 
pled not guilty. He was tried to a jury and convicted on 
certain counts but the jury deadlocked on the others. 
 
The Government moved to dismiss the deadlocked counts 
"without prejudice to their refiling" in the event any court 
ordered a new trial on the counts resulting in conviction. 
Defendant's counsel concurred and the trial court granted 
the motion. On appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's 
convictions on all counts but reversed the defendant's 
conviction for witness tampering. See United States v. 
Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996) (Stansfield I). On 
remand, the District Court directed the prosecutor to notify 
the court and defense "as to what counts, if any, he wishes 
to re-try." The Government gave notice that it intended to 
retry the defendant on both the remanded count and the 
deadlocked counts that had been dismissed. The defendant 
stood trial a second time and a jury convicted him on all 
counts.1 The defendant timely appealed. We will affirm the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3231 and this court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
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conviction on all counts except the conviction for Count V 
(arson) which we reverse. 
 
I. 
 
The underlying facts of this case were previously 
recounted at considerable length by this court in Stansfield 
I, 101 F.3d at 910-912. We summarize those stated there 
as are pertinent to this appeal. In 1990 Stansfield's home 
was destroyed by fire. His insurer, Erie Insurance Company 
(Erie), agreed to reimburse Stansfield for the replacement 
cost of the insured destroyed items, as well as the cost from 
the loss of the use of his house. In May of 1992, Stansfield 
sent Erie a list of insured items he claimed were lost in the 
fire, some of which were later found intact at other 
locations. Erie and state law enforcement officials began an 
investigation of the fire and determined that arson caused 
it. Stansfield was never conclusively found to be the 
arsonist. Erie investigators and Pennsylvania State Police 
spoke with Dwight Hoffman, a friend of Stansfield's. 
Hoffman was quite knowledgeable about Stansfield's home 
and its contents; he had stored many of Stansfield's 
personal effects in his home prior to the fire. 
 
State troopers also communicated with Jack Love, whom 
Stansfield had solicited to burn his home. Stansfield 
threatened to kill Love if he told anyone of the solicitation. 
Love informed Stansfield in May 1993 that law enforcement 
officials had contacted him about the fire. That September, 
Erie referred the matter to federal postal inspectors. The 
Postal Inspector presented the case to the United States 
Attorney's Office, which requested that the Postal 
Inspection Service continue the investigation. 
 
On October 7, 1993, Stansfield entered Dwight Hoffman's 
home uninvited. Hoffman's parents, Eugene and Joyce, 
were present but Dwight Hoffman was not. When asked 
what he was doing there, Stansfield replied that he was 
"sick and tired of [Dwight] running down[Stansfield's] 
name and ruining [his] business." Stansfield struck the 
Hoffmans, knocking them to the floor. He repeatedly kicked 
Eugene Hoffman in the head and body. When Eugene 
Hoffman attempted to get up, Stansfield knocked him down 
 
                                3 
  
again, kicking him in the head until Hoffman became 
partially unconscious. Stansfield took both the Hoffmans to 
the basement. There he bound their hands and feet. When 
Eugene Hoffman tried to free himself, Stansfield kicked him 
in the head several more times. 
 
Stansfield then went upstairs, returning shortly with a 
shotgun and shells. He loaded the gun and waited for 
Dwight Hoffman to arrive. When Dwight Hoffman appeared, 
Stansfield escorted him to the basement, hit him in the 
mouth with the butt of the shotgun, and ordered him to sit 
next to his parents. Stansfield then placed the shotgun on 
the throat of Dwight Hoffman and stated, "I'm going to ask 
you some questions, and I want the truth, because the gun 
is loaded, the safety is off, and my finger is on the trigger, 
is that clear?" 
 
Stansfield first inquired why Dwight Hoffman had sent 
the cops after him about his house, or why Dwight had 
"called the police about his fire." At some point Dwight 
Hoffman lunged for the gun. It went off, firing a shot 
between Dwight Hoffman's neck and Joyce Hoffman's head. 
A struggle ensued. Eventually Dwight and Eugene Hoffman 
were able to subdue Stansfield until a police officer arrived. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant on Counts I, II, III, VI, 
VII, and XI. The jury deadlocked as to Counts IV, V, VIII, 
IX, and X and a mistrial was declared as to these counts. 
As to Count XII, the defendant waived his right to a jury 
trial and the District Court returned a special verdict of 
forfeiture. 
 
A few days after the jury returned its verdict, the District 
Court ordered the scheduling of jury selection and retrial 
on the deadlocked counts. The Court also directed the 
Government to file notice as to whether it intended to retry 
or otherwise dispose of those counts. Complying with the 
Court's directive, the Government filed a notice and motion 
seeking the dismissal of Counts IV, V, VIII, IX, and X, 
"without prejudice to their refiling in the event a new trial 
is ordered by this or any other Court on any count of 
conviction." After conferring with defendant, defense 
counsel filed an amended certificate of concurrence.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rules 7.1 and 7.2 of the Rules of Court of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania required that pretrial and 
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Thereafter, the District Court ordered the dismissal of the 
counts "without prejudice to their re-filing in the event a 
new trial is ordered by this or any other court." 
 
On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of conviction 
as to Counts I, II, III, VI and VII, but reversed and 
remanded as to Count XI, the witness tampering count. See 
Stansfield, 101 F.2d 909. On remand, the District Court 
ordered counsel for the Government to file a notice, with a 
certificate of concurrence or nonconcurrence attached, as 
to what counts, if any, he wished to retry. The Government 
complied with the District Court's order, giving notice that 
it would retry the defendant on all outstanding counts 
(Counts IV, V, VII, IX, and XI). Defense counselfiled an 
"omnibus pretrial motion" that included, among other 
things, an objection to the Government's election to retry all 
pending counts on the grounds that the deadlocked counts 
had not been resubmitted to a grand jury, that 
reprosecution of Count V was barred by the statute of 
limitations, and that retrial of the other deadlocked counts 
was barred by the Speedy Trial Act. 
 
The District Court denied the omnibus motion stating 
that it understood the dismissal merely to reflect that the 
deadlocked counts were set aside pending the resolution of 
the defendant's post trial motions, appeals or collateral 
challenges to the judgment of conviction and sentence, and 
that the Government always intended to retry the defendant 
on the deadlocked counts. Defense counsel also filed 
another motion seeking an order directing the Government 
to specify a procedure for the refiling of Counts IV, V, VIII, 
IX and X, and objecting to the defendant's retrial on the 
dismissed counts on the basis that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion on the ground 
that the Government's notice of record of its intent to retry 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
post-trial motions, with certain exceptions not applicable in this 
instance, "shall contain a certification by counsel from the movant that 
he or she has sought concurrence in the motion from each party, and 
that it has been either given or denied." Compliance with these rules is 
generally enforced strictly, and the Clerk of the District Court will 
normally not accept a motion, other than a permissible ex parte motion, 
without a certificate of concurrence or non-concurrence attached. 
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the defendant was sufficient for the reinstatement of the 
dismissed counts. The Court, at the same time, denied 
Stansfield's motion for an order directing the Government 
to specify a procedure for refiling of the previously 
dismissed counts. The defendant again was tried to a jury 
and convicted on all counts. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, the defendant first contests the meaning of 
the term "re-filing" as used in the Government's motion to 
dismiss on the deadlocked counts. The motion stated in 
pertinent part: 
 
        WHEREFORE, the government respectfully petitions 
       the Court to enter an Order dismissing Counts IV, V, 
       VIII, IX and X, without prejudice to their re-filing in the 
       event a new trial is ordered by this or any other Court. 
 
The Court's order of dismissal tracked the exact language 
used in the Government's motion. The defendant argues 
that, regardless of whether the procedure is termed"re- 
filing" or "reinstatement," the Government did nothing to 
revive the dismissed counts: "After removal, no motion for 
reinstatement was ever filed, nor were the counts re- 
submitted to the grand jury or re-filed in any way." At oral 
argument, counsel for the defendant vigorously asserted 
that "the Government did nothing to either resubmit to the 
grand jury or reinstate by motion to the court." He asserted 
that the Government cannot merely proceed to trial on the 
dismissed counts and that the defendant is entitled to have 
the conviction on such counts vacated. However, he 
recognized that the trial court can reinstate the dismissed 
counts for prosecution. We believe this is what the court 
proceeded to do. 
 
Following this court's decision in Stansfield I vacating the 
defendant's conviction for witness tampering and 
remanding for a new trial, the District Court structured a 
procedural mechanism which effectively reinstated the 
deadlocked counts and duly placed them in position for 
prosecution. The trial judge ordered: 
 
        1. Counsel for the Government shall notify the 
       court and opposing counsel as to what counts, if any, 
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       he wishes to retry, with said notification to befiled with 
       the court on or before March 10, 1997. A certificate of 
       concurrence or nonconcurrence of defense counsel 
       shall be attached to the notice. 
 
        2. If defendant does not concur in the proposed 
       course of action, he shall file his response on or before 
       March 17, 1997. 
 
        3. If the Government fails to notify the court of its 
       intentions on or before March 10, 1997, it shall be 
       deemed to have waived any right which may exist to 
       retry any of the counts set forth in the indictment, and 
       the court will proceed to schedule resentencing. 
 
        4. In the event of a retrial, jury selection will be 
       held April 1, 1997, ... . Presentation of the case to the 
       jury will not commence before April 15, 1997. 
 
The Government complied with the District Court's order, 
notifying the defendant and the Court that it intended to 
retry the defendant on the remanded and deadlocked 
counts. Thus, the trial court did take affirmative action to 
reinstate prosecution and specifically provided in its order 
that if the defendant did not concur in the proposed course 
of action, "he shall file his response on or before March 17, 
1997." The defendant did not interpose any objection or 
make any response. He did not challenge the procedure 
that the District Court had set in place for reinstatement of 
the indictments and retrial. He raised no objection to the 
Court's explicit order that jury selection would be held on 
April 1, 1997. The defendant and his trial counsel were well 
aware that he was to be retried on the deadlocked counts 
in the original indictment. 
 
The Government strenuously argues that the deadlocked 
counts were properly reinstated following the remand of 
Count XI for trial. The only purpose in dismissing the 
counts subject to the reservation was to permit sentencing 
and the entry of a final appealable judgment on the 
convicted counts. In the event the Court of Appeals 
affirmed on those counts, there would be no retrial: if not, 
the Government reserved the right to reinstate and retry on 
the deadlocked counts. The Government notes that this 
was the understanding of the District Court and the Court 
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of Appeals, that the latter characterized the arrangement as 
a dismissal of the deadlocked counts "subject to 
reinstatement should any portion of the conviction be 
vacated." Stansfield I, 101 F.3d at 913. The Government 
observes that neither on the first appeal nor in the opinion 
of this court disposing of it, did anyone characterize the 
agreement as a dismissal subject to re-indictment. 
 
The defense, on the other hand, argues just as 
strenuously that the deadlocked indictments were 
dismissed absolutely. We do not so view the court's order or 
the Government's motion to dismiss. The motion for 
dismissal specifically requested that the counts dismissed 
be "without prejudice to their re-filing in the event a new 
trial is ordered by this or any other court." The prosecution 
is allowed considerable discretion in managing its cases 
and docket and it reserved the right to retry the deadlocked 
counts in the event a new trial was granted. The defendant 
concurred, made no objection, or any response in 
opposition. The Government's reservation of the right to 
retry was not predicated upon re-indictment. The court's 
order approved and incorporated the reservation. Although 
the term "re-filing" in the Government's motion may have 
been imprecise, especially in the context of the 
circumstances when made, the motion, nonetheless, shows 
that its purpose was to provide the Government with a 
deferred option to retry the dismissed indictments in the 
event the defendant succeeded in obtaining a new trial on 
any of the counts on which he was convicted. Nothing in 
the motion suggests that the counts were to be resubmitted 
to a grand jury before another trial. 
 
The trial judge explained what occurred and what he 
meant by the order of dismissal. 
 
        It was the court's understanding that this agreement 
       simply meant that no-retrial of the remaining counts 
       would occur absent a re-trial, for whatever reason, of 
       the counts as to which there was a verdict. Whether 
       termed "refiling," "reactivation," or"reinstatement," this 
       court was under the impression that the effect of the 
       dismissal was that these counts were simply set aside 
       pending resolution of Stansfield's post-trial motions, 
       appeals or collateral challenges to the judgment of 
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       conviction and sentence; should any of these 
       challenges be resolved in Stansfield's favor, the counts 
       as to which there was a mistrial would be pursued in 
       a second trial. The Government's brief reflects this 
       view, of course, and we believe the language of the 
       motion, order and amended certificate of concurrence 
       all support this interpretation. 
 
(7/23/97 Order at 4-6) Thus, the District Court believed, as 
did the Government, that the deadlocked counts retained 
sufficient vitality to permit their trial, either immediately or 
in the future, without resubmission to a grand jury if a 
retrial were ordered. When first indicted, they had been 
returned by a grand jury in open court, filed and docketed 
in the clerk's office, and the filings noted on the face of the 
indictment; a resubmission could achieve nothing more. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that when the Government gave 
notice to the defendant and the Court that it intended, inter 
alia, to retry the deadlocked counts, that notice served as 
the functional equivalent of reinstating the qualifiedly 
dismissed counts. The defendant points to no prejudice by 
this procedure. He had notice from the prosecution of the 
specific charges on which he was to be retried; they had 
been found by a grand jury, they had never been dismissed 
absolutely, and he still could plead the judgment in bar of 
further prosecution for the same offense. 
 
The defendant asserts that he believed by concurring 
with the Government's request to refile without prejudice 
that he was not waiving any rights he may have had to 
resubmission of the indictment to a grand jury. However, 
the defendant had no right at the time he concurred to 
have the deadlocked indictments resubmitted to a grand 
jury; the Government could have proceeded to trial on 
those counts promptly without submitting them to another 
grand jury. We fail to see how that deferment required a 
resubmission to a grand jury. An indictment is an 
accusation only, and its purpose is to identify the 
defendant's alleged offense, United States v. Glaziou, 402 
F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1968), and fully inform the accused "of 
the nature of the charges so as to enable him to prepare 
any defense he might have." Zuziak v. United States, 119 
F.2d 140, 141 (9th Cir. 1941); Mitchell v. United States, 143 
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F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944). It also enables him to plead the 
judgment, if any, in bar of further prosecutions for the 
same offense. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 
(1922); Mitchell, 143 F.2d at 953. 
 
The court's order permitting a retrial without 
resubmission of the deadlocked indictments to a grand jury 
in no way prejudiced the defendant. First, it opened up the 
possibility that he might never be retried by the 
Government and definitely avoided the reality of being 
retried immediately, a right that the Government clearly 
possessed. Second, the rights the defendant enjoyed once 
the grand jury returned an indictment against him were 
limited primarily to a speedy trial and the right to be fully 
informed of the nature of the charges so as to prepare his 
defense and the right to plead his conviction, if any, on 
those counts to bar further prosecutions. These rights were 
fully preserved and were in no way affected by the 
concurrence or the Government's dismissal of the 
deadlocked counts. The defendant attempts to structure his 
claim on the inept use of the word "refiling." In the context 
it was used it could only have meant reinstatement of the 
indictment on the court docket. The Government 
accomplished the reinstatement when it gave notice to the 
Court, and a copy to the defendant, that it would retry the 
defendant on Counts IV, V, VIII, IX and X, the deadlocked 
counts, and Count XI, remanded by the Court of Appeals. 
 
The United States Supreme Court long ago attempted to 
avoid reversal of a criminal conviction on the basis of mere 
technicalities. See Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750 
(1946). In Kotteakos, the Court observed that the effort to 
revise the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had, as its 
ultimate goal, " `not [to] be technical, where technicality 
does not really hurt the party whose rights in the trial and 
in its outcome the technicality affects.... [Rather,] the party 
seeking a new trial [has] the burden of showing that any 
technical errors that he may complain of have affected his 
substantial rights, otherwise they are to be disregarded.' " 
328 U.S. at 760 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 913, 65th Cong., 3d 
Sess., 1.). The defendant has failed to show that his 
substantial rights have been adversely affected. To the 
contrary, as evidenced by defense counsel's amended 
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concurrence, he was well aware that he would be retried on 
the deadlocked counts. His rights afforded under the Fifth 
Amendment were in no way impaired for he is not required 
to answer for a crime "unless on presentment or indictment 
of a grand jury." He was indicted, and now he has had a 
second trial on that indictment after adequate notice and 
time to prepare. We conclude that Counts IV, V, VIII, IX, 
and X were appropriately reinstated by the Government 
following this court's remand for trial of Count XI. 
 
III. 
 
The defendant also contends that the statute of 
limitations barred the Government from retrying him on 
Count V because more than five years had elapsed when 
the Government elected to retry him. 
 
The general federal statute of limitations applies in this 
instance. It provides that, except as otherwise expressly 
provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted for any non- 
capital offense unless the indictment is found within five 
years next after such offense has been committed. 18 
U.S.C. S 3282. Even though the defendant was well aware 
that the Government intended to retry him on the 
deadlocked counts, "the statute of limitations incorporates 
an `irrebuttable presumption' that, beyond the period of 
limitation, `a defendant's right to a fair trial would be 
prejudiced.' " United States v. Midgley , 142 F.3d 174, 177 
(3d Cir. 1998)(quoting in part United States v. Marion, 404 
U.S. 307, 322 (1971)). Here, unquestionably, the 
Government failed to satisfy the five year period.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The charged offense occurred on December 12, 1990. He was indicted 
on June 14, 1994, three years and one hundred and seventy-five days 
later. As of June 13, 1995, the statute of limitations began to run again 
when the indictment was dismissed. The government did not give notice 
that it intended to retry Count V until March 6, 1997, one year and two 
hundred and sixty-three days after the dismissal. The one year and two 
hundred and sixty-three day period plus the three years and one 
hundred and seventy-five day period combined totals five years and 
seventy-three days. Hence, it is unquestionable that the five year statute 
of limitation period was breached. 
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The Government argues that the June 13, 1995 dismissal 
"was part of a bargained-for exchange, from which both 
sides expected to benefit." The Government claims that it 
would not have moved for the dismissal of Count V without 
the defendant's agreement that he could be retried in the 
event of a retrial. The fundament of the Government's 
position is that the defendant "unequivocally agreed" that 
he could be retried on all the dismissed counts if this court 
remanded any or all of the counts of conviction for retrial; 
that the defendant and Government entered into a 
"bargained for exchange." 
 
There was no agreement, however, between the parties. 
The defendant never agreed that the Government could 
retry him on all counts. In particular, the defendant never 
agreed to waive the statute of limitations as to the arson 
charges, notwithstanding the Government's bold assertion 
that "[D]efendant's unqualified agreement to retrial ... 
amounted to a de facto waiver of the statute of limitations." 
The Government's reliance on the defendant's concurrence 
in the motion to dismiss the deadlocked counts as an 
"unjustified agreement for retrial" is misplaced. The 
concurrence did not rise to the level of an unequivocal 
agreement; it merely complied with a local court rule.4 The 
Rule carries no comment or history explaining its purpose. 
As we analyze it, however, the Rule is a procedural 
mechanism to expedite the business of the court. 
Compliance with it provides notice to the non-movant party 
of the proposed motion with an opportunity to acquiesce, 
by concurrence, object, except or otherwise respond. 5 The 
Government cites U.S. v. Salimo, 81 F.3d 1453, 1460-62 
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___; 117 S. Ct. 436 
(1996), for the proposition that there is no principled basis 
for treating this dismissal of the deadlocked counts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For the applicable court rule, see note 2, supra. 
 
5. Appended to the government's June 5, 1997 Notice and Motion for 
Dismissal of Counts was the defendant's certificate of concurrence, 
wherein the defendant stated that he "concur[s] in the government's 
request to dismiss Counts IV, V, VIII, IX, and X without prejudice to 
their right to refile these counts in the event that a new trial is 
ordered 
by Your Honorable Court or by any other Court on Counts I, II, III, VI, 
VII, or XI." (SA11) 
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differently than the dismissal of counts subject to 
reinstatement as part of a plea agreement. The Government 
also relies on Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, (1987), 
where the defendant, charged with first degree murder, was 
permitted to plead guilty to a lesser charge after trial 
commenced, pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea 
agreement provided for automatic reinstatement of the 
original charge if he breached the agreement. The 
defendant subsequently breached the plea agreement, and 
the first degree murder charge was reinstated; after a trial, 
the court sentenced the defendant to death. The Supreme 
Court held that reinstatement of the first degree murder 
charge was not improper. 
 
We do not believe that Salimo or Adamson are applicable. 
They both involve plea agreements, the breach of which 
nullified the plea agreement and permitted automatic 
reinstatement of the dismissed counts. As the Supreme 
Court reasoned in Ricketts, "[t]he terms of the agreement 
could not be clearer; in the event of respondent's breach 
occasioned by a refusal to testify, the parties would be 
returned to the status quo ante, in which case respondent 
would have no double jeopardy defense to waive." Id. at 9- 
10. Here, the Government reasserts in its supplemental 
letter brief to us that "both parties bargained for and 
received substantial benefit under the agreed-upon 
dismissal of the mistried counts in the instant case." As we 
have stated, the concurrence under the Local Rule of Court 
never amounted to an agreement, particularly a bargained- 
for agreement giving the defendant "substantial rights." As 
we see it, it gave the defendant nothing more than a 
possibility that the delay might lead to no subsequent trial, 
a possibility which never eventuated. 
 
In no way can we see how the concurrence can be 
construed to rise to the level of an agreement or a 
bargained-for exchange. There is nothing of record to even 
suggest that the defendant ever bargained for the dismissal 
of the deadlocked counts, that the defendant reneged on 
any bargain it made with the Government, or that 
defendant explicitly or implicitly waived the statute of 
limitations as to the arson charge. The Government relies 
on Midgley, 142 F.3d at 178, for its argument that the 
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statute of limitations was tolled; the case is inapposite.6 The 
defendant at no time misled the Government or prevented 
it from asserting its rights. 
 
The Government also argues that none of the policy 
concerns underlying the statute of limitations exist here. It 
asserts that the defendant was not exposed to an indefinite 
suspension of prosecution that impaired his constitutional 
rights or prolonged his anxiety and concern over the 
pending charges. It argues that "the procedure agreed to 
was not an indefinite suspension of prosecution but a finite 
one `limited by the time it took this court to dispose of 
defendant's first appeal.' " Moreover, it contends that 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations should apply 
because the defendant purportedly agreed that he could be 
retried on all of the dismissed counts. For reasons stated 
above, we do not agree. Thus, until the deadlocked 
indictments were reinstated, the statute continued to run. 
 
Accordingly, the defendant's conviction on Count V, 
arson, will be reversed. 
 
IV. 
 
The defendant also contends that the presence of the 
arson charge (Count V) kept him from testifying with 
respect to his defense on witness tampering (Count XI). He 
asserts: "Count XI is the fulcrum count in this indictment." 
 
The defendant's argument lacks substance because it is 
clear that "[t]here is the high probability" that the arson 
and fraud evidence would have been admitted because the 
Government "was entitled to some latitude in proving its 
witness tampering count to demonstrate its theory that 
Stansfield had acted out of the concern of exposure for the 
arson and fraud." The defendant points to no evidence to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Midgley, this court stated that criminal statutes of limitations may 
be subject to tolling, suspension, and waiver where (1) the defendant has 
actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has `in some 
extraordinary 
way' been prevented from asserting his rights, or (3) if the plaintiff has 
timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. Id. at 179 
(quoting Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d 
Cir. 1983)). 
 
                                14 
  
suggest that, having been convicted of three counts of mail 
fraud based on the arson, he would have abandoned his 
right to testify in defense of the "fulcrum count" on witness 
tampering out of fear of incriminating himself on the related 
charge of arson. As the Government observes, the 
defendant has not even proffered that if he succeeds in 
obtaining a remand he will testify under oath that he would 
have testified in defense of Count XI but for the fear of 
being convicted on the arson count. Moreover, we agree 
with the Government's observation that "[i]t defies common 
sense to suggest that defendant would have been dissuaded 
from testifying in his own defense on the `fulcrum' count by 
a fear of self-incrimination on the duplicative count of 
arson, which had no effect on defendant's Sentencing 
Guideline calculation." Nonetheless, he seeks shelter in our 
decision in United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 124-126 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 
His understanding of this court's decision in Pelullo, 
however, is misplaced. In Pelullo, the burden was on the 
Government to prove that prior testimony compelled by a 
Brady violation was not the "fruit of the poisonous tree." In 
this case, the Government was not guilty of any violation in 
presenting its case, especially a constitutional violation. In 
essence, the defendant's complaint is that he should have 
had a severance of the arson count. To obtain a severance, 
the defendant must make a convincing showing that he has 
important testimony to give on one count and a strong 
reason to refrain from testifying on another. United States 
v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400-41 (3d Cir. 1981). The 
defendant here made no effort to make such showing. He 
never moved to sever the arson count from trial on the 
other counts. This suggests that at trial the defendant had 
no concern about incriminating himself in the arson count 
by testifying in his defense on the witness tampering count. 
At his second trial, acquittal on the "fulcrum count" of 
witness tampering was paramount for him because of the 
effect of its conviction on the Sentencing Guideline 
calculation. 
 
Accordingly, we see no merit to the defendant's request 
for remand to the District Court for a hearing to determine 
whether he would have testified at the earlier trial in the 
absence of the arson charge. The request will be denied. 
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V. 
 
Finally, we turn to the defendant's argument that the 
District Court's jury instructions completely stripped the 
witness tampering statute of the required federal mens rea 
element.7 He contends that this court's decision in 
Stansfield I and the subsequent decision in United States v. 
Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (1997), created uncertainty as to the 
Government's burden under Section 1512. The defendant 
asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because"there is 
utterly no evidence in this record that [he] knew of any 
pending investigation or had the slightest intimation that it 
was either a federal offense that was under investigation or 
that federal law enforcement officers would ever be involved 
in the investigation at a subsequent time." 
 
To convict under Section 1512(a)(1)(C), this court held in 
Stansfield I: 
 
       [T]he Government must prove: (1) the defendant killed 
       or attempted to kill a person; (2) the defendant was 
       motivated by a desire to prevent the communication 
       between any person and law enforcement authorities 
       concerning the commission or possible commission of 
       an offense; (3) the offense was actually a federal 
       offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Witness tampering is codified under 18 U.S.C. S 1512. That section 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
        (C) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby 
       hinders, ... prevents or dissuades any person from-- 
 
         (1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding; 
 
         (2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United 
       States of information relating to the commission or possible 
       commission of a Federal offense ...; 
 
         (3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in 
       connection with a Federal offense; 
 
         (4) causing a criminal prosecution ... 
 
       or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
       not more than one year, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1512(a)(1)(C). 
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       in (2) above might communicate with the federal 
       authorities. The last element may be inferred by the 
       jury from the fact that the offenses were federal in 
       nature, plus appropriate evidence. 
 
101 F.3d at 918 (emphasis in original). We directed the 
District Court on remand to instruct the jury that before it 
could find Stansfield guilty of violating Section 1512(a)(1)(c) 
it must also find, in addition to the other elements of the 
offense, "both that he was motivated by a belief that the 
victim might communicate with federal authorities 
concerning the commission or possible commission of an 
offense, and that the offense in question is in fact a federal 
offense. Given appropriate evidence, if the juryfinds the 
latter fact to exist, it may find the former to exist as well." 
101 F.3d at 922. 
 
Shortly thereafter, in Bell, we observed that, under the 
statutes's clear command, the Government need not prove 
any "state of mind" on the part of the defendant with 
respect to the federal character of the proceeding or officer, 
18 U.S.C. S 1512(f). Therefore, we did not read the fourth 
element as requiring proof that "the defendant believed the 
victim might communicate with law enforcement officers 
whom the defendant knew or believed to be federal officers. 
Rather, we read this sentence as recognizing that what the 
statute mandates is proof that the officers with whom the 
defendant believed the victim might communicate would in 
fact be federal officers." 113 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis in 
original; footnote omitted). 
 
We, therefore, concluded: 
 
       [T]he law of this circuit after Stansfield is that the 
       Government must prove that at least one of the law- 
       enforcement-officer communications which the 
       Defendant sought to prevent would have been with a 
       federal officer, but that the Government is not obligated 
       to prove that the Defendant knew or intended anything 
       with respect to this federal involvement. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The District Court in this trial carefully followed this 
court's direction and instructed the jury that the 
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Government is required to prove each of the following 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt before it couldfind the 
Defendant guilty of tampering with a witness. 
 
       One, that the Defendant attempted to kill a person. 
       Two, that the Defendant was motivated by a desire to 
       prevent the communication between a witness and law 
       enforcement authorities concerning the commission or 
       possible commission of an offense. Three, that the 
       offense was actually a federal offense. And four, that 
       the Defendant believed that the witness might 
       communicate with the federal authorities. 
 
(emphasis added). The Court then elaborated on each of the 
four elements, including a statement that the Government 
need not prove that the defendant believed Dwight E. 
Hoffman might communicate with some particular federal 
officer or with an agent involved in a particular federal 
investigation or that the defendant knew or believed that 
the law enforcement officers were federal.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The elaboration included the following: 
 
        The second and third elements relate to the nature of the offense 
       or offenses which are the subject of potential communication to law 
       enforcement authorities. The offenses must be federal offenses. 
That 
       is the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
       Dwight E. Hoffman might have communicated to law enforcement 
       authorities information concerning a federal offense and that the 
       Defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent that 
       communication. The Government need not prove that such motive 
       was the sole motive for Defendant's actions, but the Government 
       must prove that it was a substantial motivating factor ... . 
 
        In fact, there need not be an ongoing federal investigation or 
even 
       any intent on the part of federal authorities to investigate. Nor 
must 
       the Government prove that the Defendant knew or believed that the 
       offense was a federal offense. Although, you may consider the fact 
       that the offense is a federal offense in determining whether there 
       might be communication with federal authorities. 
 
        The purpose of the killing must be to prevent communication with 
       a law enforcement officer when the communication relates to an 
       offense which is a federal offense, and the law enforcement officer 
       with whom Dwight E. Hoffman might communicate is actually a 
       federal law enforcement officer. 
 
(A1352-53) 
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In this instance, the District Court's instructions were 
consistent with our statement of the law in Stansfield I and 
Bell. Moreover, it is evident that the defendant is under the 
misperception that in order to convict the Government 
must specifically establish his state of mind.9 As we stated 
in Stansfield I and later clarified in Bell, the fourth element 
may be "inferred from the fact that the offense was federal 
in nature, plus additional appropriate evidence." It is 
undisputed that the offenses were federal in nature, and as 
we mention below, there was additional appropriate 
evidence. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court's 
instructions were consistent with Stansfield I and Bell. 
 
This, however, does not dispose of the remainder of 
defendant's argument, because he further claims that the 
evidence presented lacks the "additional appropriate 
evidence." He asserts that there is no evidence that he 
knew of any pending investigation or that federal officers 
would ever be involved. The latter element has no relevancy 
to the statute or charge and warrants no discussion. In its 
argument before this court in the instant case, the 
Government represents that the evidence in this trial 
closely paralleled the evidence presented in Stansfield I. 
There, we concluded the underlying offenses clearly were 
federal offenses and that evidence sufficiently supported a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 1512(a)(1)(C). We stated: 
 
       The evidence reflected that Hoffman had already 
       cooperated several times with state authorities and 
       with Erie. Stansfield had knowledge of Hoffman's past 
       cooperation and was aware that some investigation, 
       though not necessarily a federal one, was underway. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. 18 U.S.C. S 1512(f) provides: 
 
"In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind 
need be proved with respect to the circumstances 
 
       1) that the official proceeding before a judge[or court] ... is 
before 
       a judge or court of the United States ... or 
 
       2) that ... law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of 
the 
       Federal Government or a person authorized to act on behalf of 
       the Federal Government ... ." 
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       Moreover, though it is unclear whether Stansfield was 
       aware of it, the evidence also showed that federal 
       authorities had begun an investigation approximately 
       one month prior to the conduct in question. Given that 
       Stansfield violated several federal laws and based on 
       the actions he took thereafter, a jury could reasonably 
       find beyond a reasonable doubt that the attack was 
       motivated, at least in part, by Stansfield's belief that 
       Hoffman might cooperate with federal authorities. 
 
Stansfield I, 101 F.3d at 919. 
 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this trial and we 
are satisfied that it supports our previous conclusion that 
the underlying offenses were federal and that the evidence 
adequately supported a conviction under the witness 
tampering statute. 
 
Erie commenced an investigation into the cause of 
burning of the defendant's home shortly after thefire in 
December 1990, although Erie did make payments over a 
period of time on account of the policy. Richard McGee, a 
senior investigator for Erie and a former federal postal 
inspector, met with the defendant shortly after thefire and 
took a statement from him. In May 1991 he examined 
Stansfield under oath in the office of defendant's attorney, 
Leslie Fields, but thereafter the investigation lay dormant 
for much of the next eighteen months. It intensified, 
however, when McGee received an anonymous phone call in 
November 1992 that the damage to defendant's home was 
caused by fire and that the defendant was the arsonist. 
McGee communicated this information to the Pennsylvania 
State Police, with whom he kept in contact through his 
investigation, and the police officers separately conducted 
interviews and an investigation. 
 
McGee called on Dwight Hoffman's place of business, 
where he identified himself to the employees, and where 
Dee Hoffman was also employed. He interrogated Dwight 
Hoffman separately and at a secret rendezvous because of 
Hoffman's great fear of physical violence should the 
defendant learn of his cooperation with the investigation. 
On April 18, 1993, State Trooper Woodcock appeared at the 
Hoffmans' place of business and left a message for Dwight 
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Hoffman to call him. On September 10, 1993, shortly before 
defendant's assault of the Hoffmans, McGee referred all of 
his files and notes of the investigation to his former 
colleague, John Holland, United States Postal Inspector, for 
federal investigation in light of the evidence McGee had 
uncovered of potential federal violations of law, including 
mail fraud. Several weeks later, the defendant entered 
Dwight Hoffman's home and assaulted him and his 
parents. Stansfield's first inquiry of Dwight revealed his 
knowledge of and concern for the criminal investigation for 
he asked: "Why did you send the cops after me about the 
fire at my house?" By this time, Stansfield had unlawfully 
received the seven checks aggregating $377,544, the 
subjects of the federal mail fraud counts. We believe this 
evidence provided the jury with a sufficient basis on which 
to infer that the defendant knew when he viciously 
assaulted the Hoffmans that he was under criminal 
investigation, that the offenses were federal, and that they 
or one of them had communicated or might communicate 
with the federal authorities. 
 
VI. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction on 
all counts except the arson count. As to Count V, the 
conviction and sentence is reversed and the judgment of 
sentencing on all counts will be vacated and the case 
remanded to the District Court for appropriate 
resentencing. 
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